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PROPERTY-RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
ENFORCEABLE AS EQUITABLE SERVITUDE
Hercules Powder Company, assignee of covenantor, ac-
quired a parcel of land by deed containing the following cove-
nant: 'That in further consideration of the conveyance of the
within described property, the said grantee hereunder hereby
covenants and agrees that it will not conduct, operate or main-
tain, either directly or indirectly on the aforesaid property any of
the following: ... any manufacturing plant, or industry, manu-
facturing chemical or mechanical wood pulp... and the above
described covenants shall bind the said grantee herein, its suc-
cessors, representatives and assigns and shall constitute a cove-
nant running with the land." As the result of experimental work
Hercules developed a method by which it can manufacture
chemical cellulose from pulpwood instead of from cotton linters,
and proposed to build a mill on its property for this purpose.
The Continental Can Co., asignee of the original covenantee, re-
fused to eliminate the restriction prohibiting the use of its land for
the manufacture of chemical or mechanical pulp wood. The
trial court rendered a declaratory judgment holding the cove-
nant valid and enforceable. On appeal, held, affirmed. Hercules
Powder Co. v. Continental Can Co., 196 Va. 935, 86 S.E.2d 128
(1955).
Likening the restrictive covenant here with that type recog-
nized in Tulk v. Moxhayl an English case which was the first
to apply the doctrine of restrictive covenants in equity, the Court
quoted with approval the words of Lord Chancellor Cottenham:
"It is said that, the covenant being one which does not run with
the land, this court cannot enforce it; but the question is, not
whether the covenant runs with the land but whether a party
shall be permitted to use land in a manner inconsistent with the
contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he
purchased ..."2
At law, a covenant running with the land must satisfy three
requirements: There must be privity of contract between the
12 Phil.Cb. 774, 41 Eng.Rep. 1143 (1848).
'41 Eng.Rep. 1143, 1144.
parties to the covenant, privity of estate, and the restriction must
"touch and concern" the land.3 Assuming that a covenant satisfies
the requirement that it touch and concern the land, the theory
under which the duties of a convenantor can attach to his estate
and pass to a subsequent owner of the estate is predicated upon
the dual nature of a covenant. As a contract, the covenant
creates a privity of contract relationship; as a lease, the cove-
nant creates a privity of estate relationship.4 Because of its
contractual nature, the development and extension of "covenants
running with the land" have been restrained by the rules of
contract law.
Covenants between owners in fee could not be upheld un-
less there was privity of contract between these owners. Mr.
Justice Holmes in 1881 recognized this and in an attempt to ex-
tend the application of this doctrine contended that only privity
of estate was necessary between covenantee and his assigns and
between covenantor and his assigns.5 Having eliminated the re-
quirement of privity of contract, he asserted that a real cove-
nant can be created by parties who are strangers to the title of
each other, so long as the benefit and burden touch and concern
the land. This restricted application and the consequent refusal
of English courts to uphold the running at law of burdens be-
tween owners in fee led to the introduction of the doctrine of
equitable easements or servitudes.
Easements8 are not confined to agreements wherein there
is privity of contract, because the burden attaches to the land
rather than to the estate of the covenantor. The important differ-
ence lies in the distinction between enforceability of duties
against all owners and possessors of servient land irrespective
of privity of estate and duties enforceable only against owners
of the estate of which the duties are a part.'
s2 Minor Real Prop1 y §406, §1040 §1041 (2d ed. Ribble, 1928).
'Abbot, dovenants Running with the Land, 31 Yale L.J. 127 (1921).5 Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land: Part 1, 28 Va.L.Rev. 951,
962 (1942).
s Washburn, Easements and Servitudes 3 (4th ed. 1885): "The essential qualities of
an easement are these: 1st, they are incorporeal; 2d, they are imposed on crporeal
property, and not upon the owner thereof; 3d, they confer no right to a participation
in profits arising from such property; 4th, they are imposed for the benefit of
corporeal property; and 5th, there must be two distinct tenements,-the dominant, to
which the right belongs, and the servient, upon which the obligation rests."
* Reno, op. cit. supra note 5, at 964.
If the imposition of burdens and servitudes on lands were
circumscribed by the application of these two theories used in
conjunction with each other, the courts would have succeeded
in limiting and controlling the possibility of whimsical restraints
on the land within a well-defined framework. For, within the
construction of rules governing covenants running with the land,
any number of new types of affirmative or negative duties could
have been created, but the running of these duties would have
been thwarted by the rules relating to privity of estate. On the
other hand, freedom from requirement of privity of estate would
unleash the running of the burdens provided the burden fell with-
in the following outlined categories of negative easements: for
light, air, support of a building laterally or subjacently, and for
flow of an artificial stream.
There remained outside the scope of this legal network, the
situation where a purchaser would take land impressed with a
restriction at a reduced price and because the restriction did not
technically run with the land at law or could be classified as an
easement, sold it at a higher price to a subsequent purchaser who
was not bound by the restriction. Equity intervened to cover
this loophole with the doctrine of equitable servitudes..
Three theories have been advanced as a possible basis upon
which this doctrine can rest, but some cases have not recognized
any clear-cut basis and no jurisdiction has consistently followed
one theory.8 It has been suggested that equity is merely extend-
ing the doctrine of covenants running with the land, but since it
is applied even in the absence of the requirements for covenants
running with the land, this theory has been generally dis-
credited 9 Serious consideration has been given the two other
theories. One proposes that this doctrine rests on the application
by equity of the principle of specific performance of contracts
concerning land. The other asserts that it is a recognition of the
existence in equity of equitable easements not recognized or en-
forceable at law.10
Id. at 978.
9 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurispnuence 2595 (3rd ed. 1905): "This equitable right
would arise where no similar legal right, or perhaps no legal right at all, would
exist between the same parties, in the following instances: 1. Where the covenant
is not one which runs with the land, because in such case no legal liability whatever
would rest upon the subsequent grantee or owner
10 Reno, op. cit. supra note 5, at 973-976.
Since the doctrine of equitable servitudes was espoused to
apply precisely where the elements of privity of estate and con-
tract were lacking, it is in the nature of an easement and as such
should retain as a condition for its application the restriction that
it "touch and concern" the land. Some courts, however, in reli-
ance on the contract theory of servitudes have gradually ex-
tinguished the requirement that it must touch and concern the
land. As will be seen from an examination of cases in this juris-
diction and others, this choice of theoretical basis has given
parties a freer reign to impress land with restrictions which had
not before been countenanced at law in the interest of preserv-
ing the free use of land.
Confining this examination to cases involving a restriction
on the use of land either to, or in exclusion of, a business purpose,
it will be seen that there is a conflict of authority as to whether
or not such covenants touch and concern the land irrespective
of the matter of intention of the parties to the covenant. "The
intention of the parties to the covenant that it shall run with the
land is occasionally referred to in determining whether it does
run, but in the majority of cases no reference is made to the
matter, the question whether the covenant runs being regarded
as one to be determined by consideration whether it touches and
concerns the land."'1
The Virginia Court was originally aligned with the ma-
jority, questioning whether a covenant touches and concerns the
land, but has in recent cases either mentioned its irrelevancy or
has disregarded the question. It is submitted that this indicates
a shift from the more conservative "easement" theory to the more
liberal "contract" theory.
The Court's reasoning in the two early cases of Board of
Supervisors of Bedford County v. Bedford High School,12 and
Cheatham v. Taylor13 indicates a mixture of the contract and
easement theories in the first case and a tendency in favor of the
contract theory in the second. Twenty years later in Allison v.
11 3 Tiffany, Real Property §854 (3rd ed. 1939); Cole v. Seamonds, 87 W.Va. 19, 104
S.E. 747 (1920) 14 Am.Jur. 503 (1938).12 92 Va. 292, 23 S.E. 299 (1895).
1- 148 Va. 26, 138 S.E. 545 (1927).
1 188 Va. 64, 49 S.E.2d 279 (1948).
Greer14 the Court invoked the principles of the easement theory,
and in Meagher v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.15 the Court
clearly shifted into alliance with the easement theory by noting
the burden carved out of one lot of land for the benefit of an-
other lot. But in Oliver v. Hewitt'6 the Court reveals a definite
change of position from adherence to the easement theory to that
of the contract theory. It found "no difficulty in concluding that
the restriction imposed upon the use of the land is a personal
covenant for appelant's sole benefit as distinguished from a
covenant that runs with the land." It was said, "It is not for the
natural use and enjoyment of the land retained by the grantor
but is merely a restriction imposed upon the use of land con-
veyed which is simply for the purpose of protecting from in-
jurious competition the business operated by the grantor. It is
a mere personal covenant that does not run with the land in
equity ... but, in equity, one is bound by such a personal cove-
nant even though it does not run with the land if he takes title
with knowledge of its existence." The Court further quoted
with approval, "It is not binding on him merely because he has
taken the estate with notice of a valid agreement, but because
he has taken the estate with notice of a valid agreement con-
cerning it, which he can not equitably refuse to perform."17
In the Hercules case, the Court did not discuss whether the
covenant touched and concerned the land thereby creating an
easement in the land, but directed its attention to the fact that
the party having notice was bound by conscience in equity to
comply with the covenant. It cannot be easily supported that
the Court assumed that it was a covenant touching and con-
cerning the land because in another case decided earlier this
year'8 the Court held, although enforcing the covenant on other
grounds, that a covenant restricting the use of property against
using a theatre as a moving picture theatre was a personal cove-
nant. And in Tardy v. Creasy'9 it was held that a covenant to ab-
stain from the sale of wares, goods, merchandise, the keeping of
' 195 Va. 138, 77 S.E.2d 461 (1953); see also Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2
N.E. 946 (1885); Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 88 N.. 322 (1909); Tallmadge
v. E. River Bank 26 N.Y 105 (1862).
le 191 Va. 163, 60 S..2d 1 (1950).
17 See Brewer v. Marshall, 4 C.E.Gr. 542, 19 N.J.Eq. 546 (1868); Wootten v.
Seltzer, 83 N.J.Eq. 163, 90 A. 701 (1914).
la Carneal v. Kendig, 196 Va. 605, 85 S.E.2d 235 (1955).19 81 Va. 553, 59 Am.Rep. 676 (1886).
houses of public entertainment or refreshments and the estab-
lishment and erection of warehouses, factories, foundries and
shops, was collateral-purely personal-not touching the land.
Substantiating the suggestion that the Court now adheres to
the contract theory, it is pointed out that the Court quoted in the
instant case with approval from Springer v. Geddy:20 "The doc-
trine is, in brief, that when, on a transfer of land there is a cove-
nant or even an informal contract or understanding that certain
restrictions in the use of the land conveyed shall be observed, the
restrictions will be enforced by equity, at the suit of the party
or parties intended to be benefited thereby, against any subse-
quent owner of the land except a purchaser for value without
notice of the agreement."21
It has been suggested that this freedom to shift from one
theory to the other as a basis upon which the application of the
doctrine of equitable servitudes rests should be preserved be-
cause it enables a court to adjust to the specific social interests
at that time. 22 It is submitted that application of the equitable
doctrine predicated upon the "easement" theory requiring that
restrictions touch and concern the land would remedy the in-
justice resulting from the limitations of the doctrines at law and
at the same time would preserve the interest of society in the free
use and alienation of lands.
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o 172 Va. 533, 2 S.E.2d 355 (1939).
Iz d. at 540, 2 S.E.2d 355, 358.22 Reno, op. cit. supra note 5, at 978.
